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NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL: A FEDERAL AND
STATE PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
In November, 1976, the Kentucky Environmental Quality
Commission closed the radioactive waste disposal site at
Maxey Flats, Kentucky, "until the public can be assured that
it is creating no serious health defects."' This decision comes
after 14 years of radioactive waste burial at that site by the
Nuclear Engineering Company located in Pleaston, California.2
During the first 11 years of operation alone, over 5,000,000
cubic feet of solid waste and 500,000 gallons of liquid waste
were buried at Maxey Flats.
3
Concern about the hazards of radioactive materials is, of
course, not new. Contrary to the history of many other poten-
tially hazardous substances which man's technological growth
has added to the environment, the dangers of radiation were
recognized immediately. Stringent standards were established
at the outset by the Manhattan Project and subsequent con-
trols have been established for the handling of radioactive ma-
terials and the discharge of radioactive wastes into the environ-
ment.' These controls have resulted in a practically unblem-
ished health and safety record, unparalleled by any other in-
dustry. However, past success in containing radioactive mate-
Louisville Courier-Journal, Nov. 18, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
In 1960, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) announced that it would allow
private industry to bury their "low-level" radioactive waste at AEC facilities. Later,
the AEC said it would allow such burials on state-owned lands. The first private
company to respond to the AEC request for private industry participation in waste
burial operations was the Nuclear Engineering Company (NECO).
In mid-1962, the NECO operation undertook a study to determine the suitability
of a plot of land located in Fleming County in northeastern Kentucky for burial of
radioactive wastes. On the basis of a 10-day study by a geologist, NECO found the site
to be suitable. In January, 1963, NECO leased this 330-acre tract of land known as
Maxey Flats from the State of Kentucky for a period of 25 years, with an option to
renew the lease for another 25 years. J. Thomas, Evaluation of the Maxey Flats Radio-
active Waste Disposal Site (1974) (unpublished M.S. thesis in University of Kentucky
Engineering Library).
Id. at 16.
Pittman, Management of Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste (paper
presented at M.I.T. July 25, 1972).
1 As of 1963, only six United States fatalities had been documented involving
radiation or nuclear reactors. Thompson, Nuclear Reactor Function and Operation, in
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rials has provided little comfort to many concerned scientists
and environmentalists, who feel the United States is commit-
ting itself to an irrevocable reliance on nuclear power without
sufficient recognition of potentially catastrophic problems.'
One of these problems is radioactive waste-where to put it
and how to make sure it stays there until it is no longer danger-
ous.
This Comment deals with the complex problems asso-
ciated with radioactive waste management. Specifically, this
paper examines and evaluates the more prevalent means of
radioactive waste disposal. Particular focus is placed upon the
regulatory aspects of radioactive waste management and the
propriety and desirability of greater state participation in a
federally-dominated area.
I. BACKGROUND
An exiled Russian scientist recently disclosed that approx-
imately 20 years ago, an earthquake-triggered nuclear accident
killed hundreds of people in his homeland and left thousands
more seriously ill.7 United States sources speculate that the
tremors may have toppled over and cracked open dozens of
huge tanks above and below ground that were used to store the
liquid radioactive wastes of Soviet plutonium factories.8
Although the fear of exposure to radiation is relatively
new, exposure itself is not. The earth's environment has always
been exposed to radiation from the decay of various radioactive
materials in the earth's crust and from extraterrestrial sources,
such as cosmic rays from the sun.9 It was not, however, until
NUCLEAR ENERGY, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE LAW 34, 41 (E. Bloustein ed. 1964).
See UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE: A SURVEY OF THE
PUBLIC HEALTH, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND NATIONAL SECURITY EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR POWER
(1975) [hereinafter cited as THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE]. Following the release of an
official United States Atomic Energy Commission assessment of the hazards asso-
ciated with the handling of nuclear materials, published in November, 1972, the Union
of Concerned Scientists (UCS) initiated an independent, parallel study intended to
illuminate defects and important omissions in the AEC survey. The UCS reported that
the mismanagement of the United States nuclear power program had become so perva-
sive that there were serious questions as to whether the nation can, in fact, manage
such a technology with the required care. Id.
Louisville Courier-Journal & Times, Nov. 21, 1976, § B, at 6, col. 3.
"Id.
Pittman, supra note 4, at 1.
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the late 1930's that man was able to produce very large
amounts of radiation and radioactive materials.'0 In learning to
release energy in a controlled manner from the splitting of cer-
tain atoms, man discovered a potentially lethal problem-
managing the waste by-products.
II. DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE
In considering the problem of radioactive waste disposal,
it is necessary to distinguish between "high-level" and "low-
level" radioactive waste. High-level waste refers to the materi-
als (fission products and actinides)" produced during the re-
processing of the spent-fuel elements from nucler reactors and
from the manufacture of atomic weapons. 12 Because of its
radioactive longevity, biological risks, and concentration of
radionuclides, this type of waste must be perpetually isolated
from the biosphere.'3 Low-level waste refers to items con-
taminated by radioactivity in nuclear operations. 4 The prob-
lem of disposal of low-level waste lies not so much in the
amounts of radioactivity, which are small compared to those
arising directly from fuel reprocessing, but rather in their large
volume and varied form.
A. Present Disposal Techniques
Every time radioactive waste is dumped into a stream,
buried, dropped into the ocean, discharged into the air, or
otherwise released from human control, it passes into the
complex world of living things. It will pass from living thing
to living thing, sometimes being concentrated, at other times
being dispersed, with an efficiency and ingenuity which man
' Id. at 2.
The fundamental process by which energy is produced in a nuclear reactor is
the fission of heavy atoms (uranium and plutonium) called fission materials. In addi-
tion to the release of large amounts of energy, the fission process produces an average
of 2 1/2 neutrons, and two or more fission product atoms which are usually radioactive.
Both of these reaction by-products contribute to the potential radiological hazard of
nuclear power generation. Smith, On Risk Assessment of High Level Radioactive
Waste Disposal, 39 NucLEAR ENGINEERING & DESIGN 293 (1976).
, Wright, Disposal of Radioactive Wastes, 10 AToMIc ENERGY L.J. 239, 242 (1968).
,S Id. at 246.
" Id. at 241. Structural elements of the reactors, minerals in reactor coolant water,
protective clothing, air, etc. may all be rendered radioactive if they are in proximity
to nuclear fuel when it is being subjected to neutron bombardment.
1977]
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has not yet come to understand. At unpredictable times and
places, this radioactive waste will reappear in man's food, air
or water. It will not go away, for decades or centuries, or even
millenia.'5
Radioactive waste must be treated, contained, or dis-
posed of in such a way that it will not endanger the surrounding
population or the natural environment until its curie level di-
minishes to an acceptable radiation safety standard. 6 Of the
various methods used,'7 disposal into the ground has proven to
be an expedient and simple method."5
1. High-level waste
Disposal of high-level radioactive wastes is presently lim-
ited to the underground storage of liquid wastes in specially
constructed tanks. These tanks are typically made of steel and
are built on a 4-foot steel pan which is then completely en-
closed in a concrete vault with foot-thick walls. The surround-
ing area is then filled with water. The burial grounds are in an
area of impermeable clay several hundred feet thick. Both the
vault and the water are monitored and spare tanks are avail-
able to pump waste from a leaking tank. 9 At present, there are
millions of gallons of liquid waste stored in a similar fashion at
various Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) installations.21
S. NOVIK, THE CARELESS ATOM 103 (1969).
IS Formal radiation standards have been in existence for more than 40 years. The
scientific basis for these standards is a composite of thousands of studies by hundreds
of investigators worldwide which are reviewed continuously by national and interna-
tional committees. The most important of these reviewing bodies include: The Inter-
national Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), the National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP), and the United Nations Scientific
Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR). See Grendon, Nuclear Power
and the Environment, 8 FORUM 70 (1972); Hansen, Development and Application of
Radiation Protection Standards, 12 IDAHO L.J. 1 (1975).
,1 Low-level radioactive waste has been burned, released into bodies of water, or
simply pushed into hugh piles and abandoned. However, pressure exerted by environ-
mentalists and concerned citizens has led to the almost universal practice of burying
low-level as well as high-level waste.
' Atomic Age Trash, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
" Pittman, supra note 4, at 9-10.
At the end of 1969, more than 80 million gallons of such wastes were stored in
about 200 underground tanks, ranging in capacity from 300,000 to 1.33 million gallons,
at AEC facilities in Washington, Idaho, and South Carolina. UNrrED STATES ATOm=C
ENERGY COMMISSION, THE NucLEAR INDusTRY 262 (1969).
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Although technological advances are being made toward
the development of longer-lasting tanks to hold radioactive
waste, a serious problem exists concerning the integrity of the
older tanks still in use. In a 1970 survey of 183 AEC tanks, it
was found that nine had leaked or were leaking.21 In June of
1973, the loss of some 115,000 gallons of liquid waste from one
tank was discovered at the AEC's Hanford Facility, in Rich-
mond, Washington.22 Because of inadequate data it is difficult
to determine the period of time for which the tanks will main-
tain their integrity and effectively contain the liquid wastes. It
may be necessary to transfer the wastes to new tanks, with
attendant risks, at least several times before the radioactivity
dissipates sufficiently to permit some form of more effective
permanent disposal.
23
All other proposals for long-term storage or disposal of
high-level waste lie at the research and development stage.
24
Some of the proposals which have been considered include dis-
posal in solar orbit and disposal in bedded salt.2 This impre-
cise state of affairs concerning long-term storage and/or dis-
posal of nuclear wastes has caused alarm to environmentalists,
particularly in light of the great expansion of the nuclear power
industry.2 1
Reference is made throughout this paper to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC). It should be noted that this agency was abolished by the Energy Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (Supp. V. 1975), which went into effect on January
19, 1975. The Regulatory Staff of the AEC, under five Commissioners appointed by
the President, became the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the bulk of the AEC was
incorporated into the Energy Research and Development Administration under a sin-
gle administrator, also appointed by the President.
21 Atomic Age Trash, supra note 18.
22 THE NucLeAR FuEn CYCLE, supra note 6, at 267. The particular tank that leaked
was constructed in 1944 and thus was part of the older group of tanks located at
Hanford. This leak was estimated to have taken 7 weeks to occur, thus raising the
possibility that other tanks at Hanford and elsewhere may be leaking undetected.
" Snow, Radioactive Wastes From Reactors, 9 SCIENTIST AND CITIZEN 89 (1967).
On June 2, 1969, the AEC announced a proposed new policy requiring that all high-
level radioactive wastes be converted to solid form and shipped as soon as practicable
to a federal waste repository. AEC Press Release M-132 (June 2, 1969).
2, Tim NucLEAR FUEL CYCLE, supra note 6, at 219.
'Id.
Dr. Alvin Weinberg, former Director of the AEC's Oak Ridge National Labora-
tory, has written: "The price we demand of society, for this magical energy source is
both a vigilance and a longevity of our social institutions that we are quite unaccus-
tomed to. . . . Is mankind prepared to extend the eternal vigilance needed?" Wein-
berg, Social Institutes and Nuclear Energy, SCIENCE (July 7, 1972).
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2. Low-level waste
Low-level wastes have been disposed of in various ways
since the beginning of nuclear energy production. With respect
to aqueous wastes, the basic philosophy was to "dilute and
disperse" by direct release into surface waters or by seepage
into the ground.27 Originally, low-level solid waste disposal was
accomplished by mixing it with concrete in steel drums and
dumping it into the sea.28 However, because the Mexican gov-
ernment strongly opposed the dumping of radioactive wastes in
the Gulf of Mexico, the AEC ultimately denied licenses for
such activities in the Gulf on the basis of foreign policy consid-
erations.
29
Although dumping still continued in the Atlantic, this
practice died when the AEC instituted a new policy of allowing
low-level radioactive wastes to be buried at AEC facilities.
3
1
This program was expanded to permit burial of low-level
wastes on state-owned land so as to assure perpetual care of the
burial waste.
31
Even though low-level wastes do not create the major
problems of high-level waste, the sheer volume of this type of
waste produces potential problem areas. Fears exist that if bur-
ial sites are not carefully chosen and operated, 32 buried contam-
inants with long decay rates, even though remaining under-
2 Hearings on Industrial Radioactive Waste Disposal, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., vol.
2 at 989 (1959).
z' About 100,000 steel drums were buried at sea at depths in excess of 6,000 feet
before 1965. Since the drums must be weighted with concrete, there is only a small
usable capdcity available. Used for solid waste disposal, this method is three to four
times as costly as land burial. C. Fox, RAIOAcrIW WASTES 23-24 (1964).
2' In re Industrial Waste Disposal Corp., 2 A.E.C. 70 (1962), 2 ATOM. EN. L. REP.
(CCH) 11.462.
10 UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, MAJOR AcTIvriEs IN THE ENERGY
PROGRAMS, JAN.-DEc. 1960, at 101 (1961).
3, In 1963, the AEC withdrew from providing land waste burial services, based on
the availability of commercial waste disposal services which used state-owned burial
grounds in Nevada and Kentucky. Since then, additional state-owned burial grounds
have been established in Washington, Illinois, and New York. UNITED STATES ATOMIc
ENERGY COMMISSION, supra note 20, at 251-52.
1z The land-burial site at Maxey Flats has been critized because of the relatively
short period (10 days) used to gather data concerning the geological and hydrological
conditions of the area. Critics also claim the site has been operated with insufficient
monitoring equipment, insufficient record-keeping of materials buried, and inadequate
site security. J. Thomas, supra note 2, at 21.
[Vol. 65
COMMENTS
ground for many years, may have a large enough quantity of
nuclides to migrate far below ground and pollute a potable
source of water.33
B. Future Concerns
In the wake of the coldest winter ever officially recorded
in many states, the phrase "energy crisis" has become increas-
ingly significant to most Americans. When one turns his ther-
mostat up for more heat and nothing happens, his concern for
how utility companies produce the energy to heat his home
diminishes and his primary concern is simply that the energy
be produced. It is in this context that many environmentalists
fear America will turn wholeheartedly to nuclear energy to sat-
isfy her growing appetite for energy34 without completely con-
sidering the long-term impact of increased nuclear waste by-
products upon our environment. The 1973 Pugwash Conference
on Science and World Affairs concluded:
Owing to potentially grave and as yet unresolved prob-
lems related to waste management, diversion of fissionable
material, and major radioactivity release arising from acci-
dents, natural disasters, sabotage, or acts of war, the wisdom
of a commitment to nuclear fission as a principal energy
source for mankind must be seriously questioned at the pres-
ent time.35
These fears of the environmentalists have been countered
by the AEC which has consistently minimized any danger asso-
ciated with its activities." Allied with the AEC are the utilities,
nId.
' The electric power needs of the United States have been doubling approxi-
mately every 10 years for over seven decades. To meet this need, nuclear power has
become an integral part of the electrical generating economy in the United States.
Today, there are 53 licensed nuclear plants that together represent more than 7% of
our nation's total installed electrical generating capacity. In addition, there are 75
nuclear plants under construction and 106 more are planned. Rowden, Nuclear Power
Regulation in the United States: A Current Domestic and International Perspective,
17 AToMic ENERGY L.J. 102, 103 (1975).
3 Twenty-third Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Report of
Working Group on Radioactive Pollution of the Environment (August 1973).
31 According to a study released by the AEC on Aug. 20, 1974, the risks from
nuclear power plant accidents are smaller than from other man-made or natural disas-
ters. AEC Chairman Dixy Lee Ray said that there was "no such thing as zero risk,"
19771
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which have spent enormous sums of money advertising nuclear
energy as a safe and acceptable means of obtaining our nation's
energy needs without harm to the environment.37
Although the propaganda from both sides has been volu-
minous and many side issues have been raised, two basic prop-
ositions prevail. First, atomic energy technology produces sub-
stantial benefits to our energy-starved society. Second, the use
of this technology generates wastes which, if discharged or dis-
posed of in the biosphere involve some degree of risk.38 Al-
though the quantum of risk is uncertain, there can be no rea-
sonable argument but that the current and future enjoyment
of the benefits of nuclear energy technology is dependent upon
careful and meticulous consideration in the planning and im-
plementation of techniques for the management of radioactive
wastes within safe radiation limits. A critical element neces-
sary for the implementation of safe and proper techniques is
the existence of a comprehensive and perpetual regulatory
scheme.
III. THE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
Federal legislation has dealt with the regulation of the
entire nuclear energy cycle-from the mining of uranium to
nuclear waste disposal. Thus, although a particular piece of
legislation authorizing an agency or state to establish stan-
dards or supervise nuclear operations may not specifically
mention waste disposal, authority to regulate the nuclear oper-
ation field in general would give implied authority to regulate
waste-disposal operations and standards.39
but in terms of the study, the nuclear industry "comes off very well." ENERGY CmsIs
193 (L. Sobel ed. 1975).
11 Senator Lee Metcalf disclosed that in 1969, utilities spent $328.8 million on
sales and advertising, but a mere $41 million on research and development. Lapp, The
Nuclear Power Controversy, THlE NEw REPUBLIC 18 (Jan. 23, 1971).
An example of this type of advertising is a two-page spread in the June 22, 1970
issue of TIME magazine, proclaiming "The Western White House is Located about 4400
yards from this [San Onofie] California Nuclear Plant." Another advertisement ap-
peared later in 1970 (Aug. 17) which stated: "Go Play in the Nuclear Park-The
Grounds Adjacent to Nuclear Power Plants Are Safe and Clean Enough for a Chil-
dren's Playground." Elliot, Environmental Aspects of Nuclear Power, 4 URBAN LAw.
33, 36 (1972).
11 Green, Radioactive Waste and the Environment, 11 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 281,
290 (1971).
31 Recent Cases, 25 VAND. L. REv. 418, 424 (1972).
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A. Initial Federal Monopolization
Following World War II, the potential for peaceful use of
nuclear energy was unclear. However, there was little doubt
that this awesome energy source would affect our lives in signif-
icant ways. Anticipating this vast potential, Congress passed
the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.40 The Act reflected a basic
policy decision that the federal government should continue its
authority over the "development, utilization and control of at-
omic energy."41 The Act noted the potential benefits to man-
kind as well as the hazards in both military and peaceful uses
of atomic energy: the processing and utilization of source, by-
product, and special nuclear material must be regulated in the
national interest and in order to provide for the common de-
fense and security and to protect the health and safety of the
public. 2 To administer these objectives the Act established the
AEC and entrusted it with a triple role: (1) Managing the
military use of atomic energy by the services; (2) developing
and expanding peaceful use of atomic energy by private indi-
viduals and firms; and (3) assuring public health and safety
from the dangers of atomic radiation.43
The AEC thus had exclusive ownership and control of fis-
sionable materials and the facilities using them. This federal
monopoly stemmed from the historical factor of wartime devel-
opment, the federal government's monopoly of skilled person-
nel, the supposedly prohibitive costs of private or state devel-
opment, and a nascent concern for the hazards involved.
Peacetime uses of the technology were closely bound to defense
applications and thus also considered to be a matter for exclu-
sive federal concern.
B. The Shift from Complete Federal Control
Complete federal control in the nuclear energy field was
significantly shifted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.11 This
1 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970).
" Id.
42 42 U.S.C. § 2012(d)(1970).
'3 Ramey, The Environmental Effects of Producing Electric Power, Hearings be-
fore the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 136 (Oct.-Nov. 1969).
11 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970).
1977]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Act loosened the Government's monopoly on the development
of atomic energy for civilian purposes by delaying the 1946
Act's prohibitions against private ownership of utilization and
production facilities. The 1954 Act was, however, careful to
restate the authority of the AEC to promulgate the safety re-
quirements which govern the possession and use of nuclear
materials and the utilization of production facilities." As was
true of the 1946 Act, the 1954 Act did not carve out any signifi-
cant role for the states.
C. Increasing State Activity
Although Congress had never expressly precluded state
regulation, there had been little state activity in the area for
two reasons. First, federal installations, the primary hazard
sources, were exempt from state control. Second, it was as-
sumed that the federal standards for private users and handlers
preempted state action. 6 However, it was never the intention
of Congress in its original granting of exclusive regulatory pow-
ers to the AEC that these powers would be retained for an
extended period of time." The Senate report accompanying the
bill stated it was merely "interim legislation."48 As a result,
extensive Congressional studies and hearings were conducted
as to the matter of federal/state cooperation and the desirabil-
ity of increased participation by the states.
The Congressional hearings culminated in 1959 with the
addition of Section 274 to the Atomic Energy Act.49 Entitled
"Cooperation With the States," this amendment enabled the
AEC to relinquish many of its regulatory powers to the states.
As a precondition, the AEC had to be satisfied that the submit-
ted state program would be compatible with that of the AEC
and adequate to protect public health and safety.
11 The standards are those deemed necessary or desirable to promote the common
defense and security, to protect health, and to minimize danger to life or property. 42
U.S.C. § 2201(b)(1970).
11 W. BERMAN & L. HYDEMAN, THE AToMIc ENERGY COMMISSION AND REGULATING
NUCLEAR FAcILrrIEs 69 (1961).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(6)(1970).
S. REP. No. 870, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1959).
Act-of September 23, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-373, § 1, 73 Stat. 688 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2021 (1970)).
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For a state to be entitled to perform former AEC functions,
the governor of the state had to enter into a "turnover agree-
ment"5 with the AEC. The Commission's regulatory authority
would then discontinue "with respect to any one or more of the
following materials within the State: (1) By-product materials;
(2) source materials; and (3) special nuclear materials in
quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass."'" The Com-
mission still retained authority and responsibility with respect
to regulation of the construction and operation of any produc-
tion or utilization facility,52 the export from or import into the
United States of by-product, source or special nuclear mate-
rial, and the disposal into the ocean or sea of any nuclear
waste. 3 The AEC was also, at its option, able to regulate the
disposal of the by-product, source or special nuclear material
whenever the Commission deemed such regulation desirable.54
D. Growing Dissatisfaction with the Regulatory Scheme
Despite the lofty goals of Section 274, it "did not conclu-
sively allocate responsibility, and it also planted the seed for
future conflict between the federal government and the
states."" The provisions of the amendment, while establishing
a procedure to allow more state participation, gave the AEC
blanket authority to determine whether this participation was
"compatible" with the AEC's standards. In effect, the states
were still obligated to look to the AEC for the regulation stan-
dards affecting nuclear operations.
The states were concerned over the lack of clarification of
their role in nuclear energy regulation. There also was concern
by many people that the AEC's dominant regulatory role would
jeopardize the safety of persons living near nuclear facilities or
nuclear waste disposal sites. This fear rested on the premise
" 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(1970). A "turnover agreement" simply guarantees that
standards established by the AEC in regard to regulation of the listed materials will
be met by the participating state.
51 Id.
52 42 U.S.C. § 2014(v)(1970).
42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(1970).
42 U.S.C. § 2021(c)(4)(1970).
Comment, Federal Preemption of State Laws Controlling Nuclear Power, 64
GEO. L.J. 1323, 1325 (1976).
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that officials in distant Washington would have neither the
incentive nor the accountability to establish adequate safe-
guards." To bolster this argument, critics pointed to the seem-
ingly conflicting, dual role of the AEC-it has the responsibil-
ity for developing the use of atomic energy while at the same
time the responsibility for regulating the industry.
7
The states' frustration over their uncertain position in nu-
clear regulation was brought to a head in 1971 in Northern
States Power Company v. State.5" Minnesota had established
a Pollution Control Agency (PCA) which promulgated its own
radioactive waste emission standards. Northern States Power
Company, a public utility, received a construction permit from
the AEC and built a nuclear generating plant on the Missis-
sippi River at Monticello, Minnesota. Allowing for what they
considered to be a wide margin of safety, the engineers de-
signed the plant to discharge waste with a maximum emission
of only about 10 percent of the AEC-allowed radiation content.
However, this level approached or exceeded the PCA limits,
and to meet the state standard Northern States would have to
design new equipment to regulate its waste. 9
Northern States challenged the state's authority to enforce
these regulations on the ground that exclusive jurisdiction had
been vested in the AEC." The district court held that under the
doctrine of implied preemption the federal government has the
sole authority to regulate nuclear power plants, including the
regulation of radioactive effluents discharged from such facili-
ties. The court found the intent to preempt in the 1959 amend-
ment itself" and in its legislative history. The court predicted
"1 See Boffey, Gofman and Tamplin: Harassment Charges Against AEC,
Livermore, 169 SCIENCE 838 (1970); Gillette, Reactor Emissions: AEC Guidelines Move
Toward Critics' Position, 172 SCIENCE 1215 (1971); Walsh, Vermont: Forced to Figure
in Big Picture, 174 SCIENCE 44 (1971).
11 "Remarkable is the Atomic Energy Commission, the Agency which has sole
responsibility for the development and use of atomic energy. The AEC is also the
agency with sole responsibility for regulation in this field. In fact, it is responsible for
regulating its own activities. . . ." S. NovWCK, supra note 15, at 193.
447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), af'd 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
" 447 F.2d at 1145.
80 Id.
61 The court was supported by restrictions on the AEC's power to relinquish au-
thority in 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c), (k)(1970), which state that: "Nothing in this section
shall be construed to afect the authority of any State or local agency to regulate
activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards."
928" [Vol. 65
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that, "were the states allowed to impose stricter standards on
the level of radio-active waste releases discharged from nuclear
power plants, they might conceivably be so overprotective in
the area of health and safety as to unnecessarily stultify the
industrial development and the use of atomic energy .. "62
Furthermore, the court made note of the fact that Minnesota
did not have a turnover agreement with the AEC,63 although it
did not clarify what effect such an agreement would have.
E. After Northern States
Some authorities have concluded that Section 274 of the
Atomic Energy Act expressly preempts all state regulation of
radiation hazards that conflicts with the growth of nuclear gen-
eration of electricity and that is not pursuant to a valid AEC
turnover agreement . 4 They point to the opinion in Northern
States, which held that the AEC alone was capable of objec-
tively balancing the legitimate interests involved and setting
health and safety standards in accordance with desired in-
dustrial progress. 5 The states, it was reasoned, would be
"overprotective in the area of health and safety. . . ..' Oppo-
nents of the above position assert that Congress did not ex-
pressly show an intent for the federal government to occupy
exclusively the field of nuclear regulation. They point to the
dissent in Northern States, which argued that the majority's
"national interest" rationale was not persuasive when con-
trasted with the interest of the states in protecting the health
and safety of their citizens from radioactive pollution .6 The
dissent suggests that in this area, which may profoundly affect
the environment, the states should be permitted to regulate
radioactive pollution because of its impact on the local environ-
ment.
This line of reasoning was used in In re Dresden Nuclear
,2 447 F.2d at 1154.
Id. at 1149.
See Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear "Moratorium" Legislation in the States and
the Supremacy Clause: A Case of Express Preemption, 76 CoLuM. L. REv. 392, 445-46
(1976). See note 50, supra, for a definition of "turnover agreement."
447 F.2d at 1153-54.
Id. at 1154.
*7 Id. at 1154-58.
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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Power Station,6" in which the Illinois Pollution Control Board
disagreed with the majority in Northern States and found
nothing in the law to prohibit the federal and state govern-
ments from jointly exercising authority in the field. " The
Board stated that the issue was whether its limitations in any
way conflicted with the purpose of the federal statute, and held
they did not. The Board pointed out that "there is no particu-
lar reason why the emissions from nuclear plants in Vermont
should be the same as those in New Mexico.
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CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the states are willing to assume a more
meaningful role in the regulation of the nuclear energy field.
Specifically, the states have an interest in establishing ade-
quate safety standards concerning the disposal of high- and
low-level radioactive waste.7" It is also apparent that there is a
great deal of conflict concerning the states' proper role in this
area.
It may be argued persuasively that the allowance of con-
current "reasonable" state regulation of pollution (radioactive
waste) is not a bold or untried concept. In other areas where
federal enactments have imposed controls on environmental
pollution, Congress has provided for such a "reasonableness
test" within the statutory framework of its regulatory scheme.
For example, in the Air Quality Act of 1967,72 HEW was author-
ized to develop air quality criteria73 for the various "air quality
control regions" of the country. The states were then required
to establish air quality standards and enforcement measures
consistent with the federal criteria. The Act specifically pro-
vided that the states were not precluded "from adopting stan-
dards and plans to implement an air quality program which
6' 2 E.R.C. 1302 (Ill. Pollution Control Bd. 1971).
'9 Id. at 1304.
o Id. at 1306.
71 Minnesota's maverick action in Northern States has evolved into a minor rebel-
lion by the states which could lead to Balkanization of authority over radiation stan-
dards; at least 24 states have indicated support for Minnesota's position. Gillette,
supra note 56.
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-8571 (Supp. V, 1970).
71 Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 107(b), 81 Stat. 490 (1967).
11 Id. § 107(a)(2).
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will achieve a higher level of ambient air quality than approved
by the Secretary.
'7 5
The fear expressed by the court in Northern States, that
state regulation will impede the development of atomic energy,
may be unfounded. The federal courts are in a position to strike
down any regulation which is unreasonable on grounds analo-
gous to those applied to the taxation of interstate commerce by
the states."
The potential consequences of a reactor accident or of the
unintentional release into the environment of a large amount
of radioactive material from archival storage provide the incen-
tive to clarify the responsibilities of the federal government and
the states in regulation of nuclear energy production, material,
and waste. Furthermore, the potential benefits of increased
state responsibility in this area outweigh any potential hindr-
ance to nuclear energy development or production. Local citi-
zens may prefer state regulation because of a feeling that local
officials will be better able to protect their health and safety
interests than will distant Washington bureaucrats. If any-
thing, increased and better coordinated state regulation will
enhance the public acceptance of nuclear energy production,
which is necessary to its long-term development. Even more
important is the likelihood that increased state participation
will insure an adequate institutional network to monitor and
attend to the radioactive storage facilities in the years ahead.
Larry E. Rogers
71 Id. § 109, 81 Stat. 497.
7, See National Bella Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756-58 (1967).
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